Incidents That Define Process Safety 1st Edition

I have been working in the oil refining business for 33 years. I was scheduled to be in the Texas City refinery on the day of the explosion there, but my meeting was delayed, fortunately for me. Since then, I have made it my business to document incidents and near-misses that never reach the news. This book is a godsend for me, because it classifies incidents by root cause, and because it explains process fundamentals. Many accidents, such as the Tosco Avon explosion are caused by lack of process understanding, not just by operators, but by engineers and managers.

This is a great book for mid management level people in the petrochemical industry. Not going to give any design engineers their knowledge but an excellent pick up and set down book describing most of the common causes of industrial accidents from design, operation, communication, ergonomics et all. As a reminder on how easy things can go wrong, escalate, intertwine and leave devastating aftermath. Everyone with an interest in process safety will learn something from this book. Also it is a book I believe will probably have saved quite a few accidents or escalations of accidents since it's first publication six years ago.

This book goes a lot further than previous books, in that it looks at incidents outside the process industry, and explores the failings of all elements of process safety. Obviously BP is stepping up the effort to become a recognized leader in process safety (those words were written for them by someone else, weren't they?) Anyway, it's a fascinating and informative read that should arm process safety professionals for scenarios from the boardroom to the confined space.

As a Process Reliability Engineer working in a major refinery I looked forward to reading this book. I ordered it hoping that it would be an extension of British Petroleum's fact-based and well-articulated sixteen volume process safety series available through Amazon and IChemE (ISBN 0852955219). The sections that explain the sequence of events behind refinery safety incidents are excellent. They contain meaningful lessons learned about equipment operation, maintenance, and human factors that readily apply in the processing and manufacturing industry. BP displays an incredible amount of humility by allowing the public to look deep inside some of their own process safety failures. It is our responsibility to constructively use this information to avoid repeat failures in our own facilities.But what spoiled it for me is the insertion of "lessons learned" from some highly sensationalized, historic disasters. For example, the Hindenburg summary on pages 52 - 56 ties the safety message to theoretical arguments based on limited research and internet blogs instead of the sound forensic engineering practice that was used to determine a probable cause for the manufacturing industry case histories. This sometimes distracts from an important safety message that would have otherwise stood firm on its own merit.

Not the best written book out there but it describe process safety accidents good enough to understand what went wrong.

Tales of Incidents Grim - BB (Boring)Incidents That Define Process SafetyBy John Atherton and Frederic GilReviewed by Nick SandsMany younger employees do not remember the process plant disasters of the 1980's. John Atherton and Frederic Gil have summarized many of those events and more in Incidents the Define Process Safety, published by the Center for Chemical Process Safety. Atherton has 40 years of experience, including 25 years working for BP in process safety management. He is a chartered engineer, a member of IChemE and was awarded the Ned Franklin medal by IChemE for his contributions to process safety. Gil has worked as a fire, process safety and loss prevention engineer for 18 years.The incidents are grouped in chapters by common cause, though multiple factors contributed to all of the incidents. The first cause is blind operation where the hazards are not seen, including two plane crashes and the incident at Three Mile Island. Design has contributed to incidents as well, like the biggest process incident in history at Union Carbide in Bhopal. The Hindenburg fire is also covered with this group. External causes contributed to the fire storm at Pemex in Mexico City and fire at Tupas in Izmit, Turkey.A lack of inspection and maintenance was a factor in the fire at Texaco in Milford Haven and the HF release at Marathon Oil in Texas City. Failure to provide adequate process knowledge is cited as a cause in the BLEVE (boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion) at Elf in Feyzin and the explosion at AZF in Toulouse. Other incidents were partially caused because process hazards were not understood, including the explosions at Esso in Longford and at BP in Grangemouth.Improper management of change is associated with two of the most famous incidents, the Chernobyl disaster and the explosion at Nypro in Flixborough. Missing the opportunities to learn from previous near misses was a factor in the destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia. Poor operating procedure was one of the causes for the most recent incident cited, the explosion at BP in Texas City.Several disasters occurred in part due to poor practice around work permits, including the incident at Motiva in Delaware, the explosion at Phillips in Pasadena, and Piper Alpha platform fire that killed 167. Poor emergency response contributed to the consequences of the incident at ICMESA in Seveso which helped inspire the EU Seveso directive. Emergency response was also a factor in the boil over at Tacoa in Venezuela. The final group of incidents is related to human factors, including the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska.Sharing the lessons of history is always of benefit. Atherton and Gil broaden the usual list with many non-process incidents. While this may be interesting in a historical sense, it leaves little room to fully discuss the process incidents that really did define process safety. The diluted discussion makes Incident that Define Process Safety a more boring book (BB) than it had to be.